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1825 
UNTIL THE PLENARY POWER DO US PART:  
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE DEFENSE OF 
MARRIAGE ACT IN IMMIGRATION AFTER 
FLORES-VILLAR 
JESSICA PORTMESS∗ 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) effectively bars a U.S. citizen from 
sponsoring a foreign national same-sex spouse to immigrate to the United 
States.  The plenary power doctrine—a standard of extraordinary deference to 
the political branches in immigration—may hinder judicial scrutiny of 
DOMA in the immigration context.  In the past two decades, and most recently 
in Flores-Villar v. United States, the Supreme Court has failed to establish 
boundaries of judicial deference in immigration cases; however, dissents 
throughout the Court’s plenary power case law illuminate possible limitations 
on the doctrine’s scope. 
This Comment argues that courts should adopt a limited substantive 
framework that confines plenary power deference to four substantive areas of 
immigration law:  (1) admission, (2) removal, (3) naturalization, and (4) 
immigration policy distinctions.  When determining whether a case involves 
one of these four substantive areas, courts should apply Justice O’Connor’s 
logically prior standard set out in her dissent in Nguyen v. INS.  Employing 
this limited substantive framework and standard, DOMA is likely beyond the 
scope of plenary power deference.  This Comment concludes that DOMA 
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should thus be subject to traditional standards of constitutional scrutiny even 
in the immigration context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite his fifteen-year relationship with a U.S. citizen,1 Paul 
Wilson Dorman was facing deportation in early 2011 after the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of his immigrant 
visa petition.2  Mr. Dorman, an Irish national who arrived in the 
                                                        
 1. Editorial, Couple Without a Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2011, at A14. 
 2. See Julia Preston, Judge Gives Immigrant in Same-Sex Marriage a Reprieve from 
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, at A12 (reporting that the BIA denied Mr. 
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United States in 1996,3 joined in a civil union with his U.S. citizen, 
same-sex partner in New Jersey in 2009.4  Mr. Dorman now seeks to 
immigrate to the United States based on this relationship5—an 
immigration benefit routinely extended to heterosexual couples.6  A 
formidable obstacle currently stands in his way: the Defense of 
Marriage Act7 (DOMA) precludes recognition of same-sex unions 
when interpreting any congressional act or administrative 
regulation.8  On April 26, 2011, however, Mr. Dorman’s case showed 
a glimmer of hope when Attorney General Eric Holder vacated the 
BIA’s decision ordering Mr. Dorman’s deportation.9  Attorney 
General Holder remanded the case for the BIA to determine 
“whether and how the constitutionality of DOMA [was] presented” 
in Mr. Dorman’s case, and whether Mr. Dorman’s civil union could 
provide relief from deportation notwithstanding DOMA’s federal 
definition of marriage.10 
Mr. Dorman’s experience is emblematic of the obstacles facing 
same-sex partners seeking to immigrate to the United States based on 
relationships with U.S. citizens.  With six states and the District of 
Columbia now issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and five 
states recognizing same-sex civil unions,11 DOMA affects an estimated 
                                                        
Dorman’s petition because his same-sex relationship was not recognized under 
DOMA). 
 3. Editorial, supra note 1. 
 4. Preston, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage:  Immigration Rules and Their 
Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 537, 546 (2010) (explaining that most foreign nationals are permitted to 
immigrate on the basis of family unity). 
 7. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified 
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 8. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “marriage” as “only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife”); see also Suzanne Gamboa, Holder 
Intervenes in Gay Man’s Deportation Case, SEATTLE TIMES (May 5, 2011, 4:31 PM), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2014974446_apusgayimmigra
nts.html (stating that the BIA affirmed the deportation order against Paul Wilson 
Dorman on the basis of DOMA, which prohibited recognition of the civil union with 
his male partner). 
 9. See Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011) (remanding the case to the BIA 
to decide the merits notwithstanding DOMA’s federal definition of marriage). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Ill. Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP 
STAT. 75/10 (2012) (defining “civil union” as a “legal relationship between 2 
persons” regardless of sex); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) 
(declaring the bar on same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the equal 
protection clause of the Iowa Constitution); Defining Marriage:  Defense of Marriage Act 
and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-
overview.aspx (last updated June 2012) (identifying Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia as states 
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35,000 U.S. citizens whose foreign national same-sex partners cannot 
use their relationship to remain in the United States.12  The executive 
branch, however, has recently indicated that it will no longer defend 
DOMA in the courtroom,13 and binational same-sex couples are 
seeing similar glimmers of hope in immigration cases across the 
country.14 
While Attorney General Holder’s decision may signal a step 
towards recognizing same-sex marriages in the immigration context, 
the Obama administration has far from abandoned its duty to 
enforce DOMA.15  At the same time that Attorney General Holder 
proclaimed in a February 2011 letter to Congress that the executive 
branch will no longer defend DOMA in the courts, he confirmed the 
commitment to enforce DOMA at the administrative agency level,16 
which includes agency adjudication of immigrant visa petitions.  Until 
DOMA is repealed or a challenge to its application in immigration 
cases succeeds in court, it will continue to effectively bar same-sex 
partners from immigrating on the basis of relationships with U.S. 
citizens.17  With courts uncertain of how Congress’s immigration and 
                                                        
that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island as states that allow civil unions between same-sex couples). 
 12. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 540 (stating that this estimate reflects the number 
of U.S. citizens living in the United States with foreign national same-sex partners). 
 13. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to John A. Boehner, 
Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter 
from Att’y Gen.], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-
223.html (concluding that DOMA fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the 
standard the executive branch argues should apply to classifications based on sexual 
orientation). 
 14. See Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, (June 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/ 
us/30immig.html (describing the cancellation of the deportation of a foreign 
national who was denied legal residency as the spouse of a U.S. citizen because of 
DOMA). 
 15. See generally Julia Preston, Justice Dept. to Continue Policy Against Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A15 (explaining that according to the Attorney 
General’s spokesperson, Attorney General Holder intervened in the Dorman case to 
compel the BIA to “decide issues he felt had been overlooked,” but the executive 
will continue to enforce DOMA); Amy Taxin, Green Cards for Gay Couples?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2011, 1:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/06/06/green-cards-for-gay-couples_n_871818.html (reporting that in the wake 
of the Attorney General’s intervention in the Dorman case, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement has vowed to enforce DOMA until the law is repealed or struck down 
by the courts, leaving same-sex couples confused about what to expect in the 
immigration process).  But see Gamboa, supra note 8 (reporting that some, like 
Dorman’s attorney, view the Attorney General’s intervention as a “far-reaching 
victory” and evidence of the Obama administration’s “commitment to nullify” 
DOMA). 
 16. Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13. 
 17. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 541 (stating that DOMA has “closed the door to 
same-sex marriage recognition under the [Immigration and Nationality Act] for 
now”).  The Immigration and Nationality Act is the primary legislation that governs 
PORTMESS.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:22 PM 
2012] UNTIL THE PLENARY POWER DO US PART 1829 
naturalization authority influences judicial scrutiny of DOMA in 
immigration cases, these cases are excluded from the dialogue on 
DOMA’s constitutionality.18 
For over a century, the Supreme Court has understood Congress to 
have “absolute and unqualified” power in immigration.19  The Court 
has historically interpreted this “plenary power” to limit judicial 
review of immigration statutes and has created diluted standards of 
constitutional analysis in deference to Congress.20  In recent decades, 
the Court has consistently avoided confronting the plenary power 
doctrine directly.21  The Court most recently deflected the question 
of the doctrine’s modern boundaries with its decision in Flores-Villar v. 
United States,22 affirming the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s deference to Congress and refusing to clarify the standard of 
scrutiny that applies in challenges to immigration statutes.23  Mr. 
Dorman’s case and similar cases challenging DOMA’s application in 
immigration provide the latest opportunity for lower courts to clarify 
the relationship between judicial scrutiny of DOMA and Congress’s 
plenary power in immigration.  Lower courts would benefit from the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in questions as to the scope of the plenary 
power doctrine—guidance the Court failed to provide in Flores-
                                                        
U.S. immigration and citizenship.  See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(INA) Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182–87 (1952) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 18. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 544 n.15 (questioning whether DOMA’s federal 
definition of marriage applies to immigration through Congress’s plenary power).  
But see Jordana Lynne Mosten, Note, Imagining Immigration Without DOMA, 21 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 384 (2010) (assuming that Congress’s authority to exclude same-
sex spouses “is not open to legal challenge” because Congress can bar same-sex 
immigration through DOMA due to the plenary power doctrine). 
 19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (describing 
Congress’s “absolute and unqualified” power to prohibit the entrance of or to expel 
foreigners). 
 20. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (defining the plenary power doctrine as the recognition of the 
political branches’ long-established power to expel or exclude aliens free from 
judicial control); see also infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the deferential standards applied 
in immigration cases that are otherwise foreign to traditional constitutional analysis). 
 21. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001) (concluding that it was unnecessary 
to determine whether a lesser degree of scrutiny was warranted by Congress’s plenary 
power because the statute in question satisfied the appropriate level of scrutiny); 
Miller, 523 U.S. at 432 (narrowing the constitutional question before the Court to the 
extent that the Court did not need to consider the plenary power doctrine’s 
influence on the extent of judicial review). 
 22. 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).  The Flores-Villar Court affirmed the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision to dismiss an inquiry of the 
appropriate level of scrutiny in matters of immigration and citizenship because the 
statute in question satisfied intermediate scrutiny.  Id. 
 23. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing a series of immigration cases where the 
Supreme Court avoided clarifying the plenary power doctrine’s boundaries, 
including the Court’s most recent decision in Flores-Villar). 
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Villar24 or with its denial of certiorari in the similar case of Johnson v. 
Whitehead.25  This Comment argues that the plenary power doctrine 
should be limited in scope to questions of admission, removal, 
naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions and that Congress 
did not enact DOMA using its plenary power because DOMA does 
not fit within this limited substantive framework.  Thus, plenary 
power deference cannot shield DOMA from traditional constitutional 
standards of scrutiny because Congress did not use its immigration 
power to enact DOMA. 
Part I analyzes the plenary power precedent and the evolution of 
that power throughout the history of the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the doctrine.  This Part also discusses DOMA’s 
application in the immigration context, particularly at the immigrant 
visa petition stage, and how it serves as a practical bar to the 
immigration of binational same-sex couples.26  Part II illuminates the 
limits of the plenary power doctrine generally and proposes a limited 
substantive framework that confines the doctrine’s scope to questions 
of admission,27 removal,28 naturalization,29 and immigration policy 
                                                        
 24. Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. at 2313 (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s deferential 
standard without issuing an opinion). 
 25. American University, Washington College of Law’s UNROW Human Rights 
Impact Litigation Clinic filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court 
raising an equal protection challenge in a case similar to Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-
Villar.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120 
(4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-378).  The Johnson petition challenged an immigration 
statute that imposes different requirements on U.S. citizen mothers and fathers for 
conferring citizenship on illegitimate children.  Id. at *3–4.  The Court denied the 
petition.  Johnson v. Whitehead, 132 S. Ct. 1005 (2012).  Although the Supreme 
Court does not currently have any DOMA challenges on its docket, the prominent 
immigration legal organization, Immigration Equality, has recently filed suit in 
federal district court challenging DOMA in the immigration context.  See Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus, Blesch v. Holder, No. CV 12-1578 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 2, 2012); 
see also Julia Preston, Noncitizens Sue Over U.S. Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/noncitizens-sue-over-us-defense-of-
marriage-act.html (noting the lawsuit brought by Immigration Equality on behalf of 
five same-sex couples).  The suit may eventually give the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to remedy its failure to confront the plenary power in Flores-Villar. 
 26. “Immigration” is used broadly to encompass all facets of immigration law, 
including the benefits extended to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in the 
immigration context.  This Comment argues that a nuanced understanding of 
immigration law is possible and necessary in order to understand the limits of 
DOMA’s application to same-sex couples involving a foreign national. 
 27. “Admission” is a term of art in immigration law and is defined as the “lawful 
entry of an alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an 
immigration officer.”  INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006).  Prior to 
the 1996 amendments to the INA, aliens who were considered not to have “entered” 
the United States were subject to exclusion proceedings while aliens considered to 
have “entered” were subject to deportation proceedings.  See Landon v. Plasencia, 
459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) (explaining the differences between deportation and 
exclusion proceedings).  With the 1996 amendments, the “entry” concept was 
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distinctions.  This part also argues that DOMA provides a specific 
illustration of the plenary power’s limits because its influence on 
certain portions of the immigration process is beyond the doctrine’s 
scope.  Part III discusses the limited substantive framework’s 
implications for judicial scrutiny and argues that traditional 
constitutional standards, like strict or intermediate scrutiny, should 
apply in challenges to DOMA in immigration. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Defining Congress’s Plenary Power in Immigration 
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reference Congress’s 
power to legislate generally in immigration.30  The Constitution’s 
reference to Congress’s authority to legislate in immigration is 
limited to Article I, Section 8, which gives Congress the authority to 
“establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”31  The only remaining 
reference to Congress’s immigration and naturalization authority is 
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states 
that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the state wherein they reside.”32 
Absent explicit authority under the Constitution, Congress’s power 
to legislate in immigration is rooted in more than a century of case 
law.33  The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Congress 
has plenary power to legislate in immigration.34  Supreme Court 
                                                        
replaced by “admission” and the grounds of exclusion were replaced by grounds of 
inadmissibility.  See INA § 212 (containing the grounds of inadmissibility). 
 28. See INA § 237 (setting forth the grounds of deportability for which an alien 
can be removed from the United States after being admitted).  This Comment uses 
“removal” and “deportation” interchangeably. 
 29. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 686 (1898) (defining 
naturalization as the “admission of aliens to citizenship by judicial proceedings”). 
 30. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty:  A Century of 
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 (1987) (noting that the 
power to regulate immigration is not one of Congress’s enumerated powers). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 33. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) 
(acknowledging that the federal government’s “broad, undoubted power” over 
immigration rests in part on constitutional authority); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (establishing a standard of judicial deference to 
Congress’s legislation in immigration). 
 34. While this Comment does not seek to catalog every plenary power decision, 
many scholars have engaged in extensive analyses of the evolution of the plenary 
power doctrine throughout history.  See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 30, at 885–86 
(arguing that the doctrine established by a century of plenary power case law has 
come back to haunt us, and that Congress’s plenary power in immigration must be 
subject to constitutional limitations); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
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Justice Frankfurter articulated the weight of the plenary power 
precedent when he wrote, in Galvan v. Press,35 that “there is not 
merely ‘a page of history’ . . . but a whole volume.”36 
1. The foundation of the plenary power doctrine:  Unqualified deference to 
 Congress 
The Supreme Court, in 1889, first articulated what came to be 
known as the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States.37  In Chae Chan Ping, the Court upheld an order denying entry 
to a Chinese foreign national based on a congressional act excluding 
all Chinese laborers.38  The Court articulated Congress’s broad 
authority in immigration and established a standard of extraordinary 
deference to Congress that would become the hallmark of plenary 
power case law.39  The Court justified this deference on the grounds 
that decisions to exclude foreigners are deeply rooted in the nation’s 
sovereign powers and directly related to national interests and 
defense.40  The Court announced Congress’s broad authority to bar a 
foreign national’s entry when “the public interest requires such 
exclusion.”41 In deferring to Congress, the Court limited judicial 
review in decisions of exclusion.42  Thus, the Court in Chae Chan Ping 
gave life to the plenary power doctrine of deference to Congress and 
limited judicial review in immigration cases. 
During the four years following Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court 
twice returned to the plenary power doctrine.  First, in Nishimura Ekiu 
v. United States,43 the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s power, free 
from judicial scrutiny, to set rules for the admission of foreign 
                                                        
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260–95 (analyzing the 
various theories and externalities underlying the Supreme Court’s plenary power 
jurisprudence); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560–75 
(1990) (analyzing the distinction between constitutional and subconstitutional 
norms in immigration law to explain the peculiar development of constitutional 
analysis in plenary power precedent). 
 35. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
 36. Id. at 530–31. 
 37. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 38. Id. at 582, 611. 
 39. See Henkin, supra note 30, at 858–59 (explaining that although the Court in 
Chae Chan Ping did not say that the power to regulate immigration was free from 
constitutional constraints, the Court’s holding and dicta have been interpreted to 
mean that Congress’s power to regulate immigration is free from such constraints). 
 40. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–07; see also Legomsky, supra note 34, at 274 
(explaining that by situating the decision within the concept of “sovereignty,” the 
Court did not need to justify the plenary power with any constitutionally enumerated 
authority). 
 41. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–07. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
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nationals.44  In upholding an immigration inspector’s decision to 
deny admission to a Japanese national, the Court insulated the 
discretionary decisions of executive officers from judicial review.45   
Second, the Supreme Court further extended the plenary power 
doctrine to decisions of expulsion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.46  
In Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting, the Court again justified 
Congress’s plenary power in terms of national sovereignty.47  The 
decision in Fong Yue Ting marked an important milestone in plenary 
power jurisprudence, however, as the Court distinguished between 
the protections that might be afforded to aliens seeking entry to the 
United States and aliens already within the United States.48  This 
distinction caused tension throughout the plenary power case law 
that followed and led to the Court’s recognition, early in the line of 
plenary power cases, of a procedural due process limitation.49 
In light of this distinction between the rights of aliens outside the 
United States and aliens already within the United States, the Court 
acknowledged in dicta in the 1903 case of Yamataya v. Fisher50 that a 
foreign national within the United States should be afforded certain 
procedural due process protections.51  The Court held, however, that 
in the case of a foreign national seeking entry, “the decisions of 
executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly 
conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”52  Foreshadowing the 
ongoing conflict between the plenary power doctrine and traditional 
constitutional safeguards, the Court concluded that while the plenary 
power prevented judicial review of substantive due process issues,53 
deportation proceedings may afford foreign nationals who are 
                                                        
 44. Id. at 659. 
 45. Id. at 660. 
 46. 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893). 
 47. Id. at 711; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. 
 48. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724 (stating that foreign nationals, while in the 
United States, are entitled to the safeguards of the Constitution for their rights of 
person, property, and civil and criminal liability, but if they remain aliens, they are 
subject to removal whenever Congress deems their removal “necessary or expedient 
for the public interest”). 
 49. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the procedural due process exception to the 
plenary power doctrine). 
 50. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 51. See id. at 100 (concluding that immigration legislation does not “necessarily 
exclude opportunity to the immigrant to be heard, when such opportunity is of 
right”). 
 52. Id. at 98. 
 53. See id. at 97–98 (invoking the plenary power precedent to justify limits on the 
judicial review of procedures Congress establishes for determining whether aliens 
will be permitted to enter the United States). 
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present in the United States some procedural due process 
protections.54 
The Court thus laid the foundation of the plenary power doctrine 
with unqualified justifications of state sovereignty, foreign relations, 
peace, and security.55  Early plenary power cases reflect “an absolute 
‘hands off’ approach by the Court”56 and have limited the application 
of traditional constitutional standards in immigration law.57  By 
establishing the plenary power doctrine with sweeping statements of 
sovereignty and generalized references to the field of immigration, 
the Court erected a formidable obstacle to constitutional challenges 
involving immigration. 
2. The evolution of the plenary power doctrine:  “Limited” judicial review 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts struggled to 
address constitutional challenges in immigration cases within the 
constraints of the firmly entrenched plenary power doctrine.58  By the 
next wave of plenary power cases in the 1950s, the nineteenth-century 
plenary power case law guided the Supreme Court through stare 
decisis, sometimes seemingly to the Court’s chagrin.59  By the 1970s, 
however, the Court began to routinely review certain constitutional 
challenges in recognition that judicial review, albeit “limited,” was 
appropriate in immigration cases.60 
In the 1950 case United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,61 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the limited judicial review of exclusion 
                                                        
 54. See id. at 101 (stating that aliens who are present in the United States and 
who have become a “part of its population” are entitled to an opportunity to be 
heard before they are deported). 
 55. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893) (justifying 
the “right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners” as inherent to its sovereignty 
and incidental to Congress’s control of matters of foreign relations, peace, and 
security). 
 56. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 805 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 57. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 260 (stating that plenary power precedent has 
established that “immigration is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional 
law simply do not apply”); Motomura, supra note 34, at 613 (arguing that the “most 
fundamental problem” caused by the plenary power doctrine is that it has “seriously 
impaired the process of dialogue” on the role of constitutional standards in 
immigration law). 
 58. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 289–92 (outlining the effect of changing 
political forces on the nation and the Court’s attitude toward immigration 
throughout the twentieth century).  Stephen Legomsky was appointed Chief Counsel 
of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2011. 
 59. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (lamenting the fact that the 
“slate is not clean” for the exercise of judicial discretion in challenges to 
immigration statutes); see also Legomsky, supra note 34, at 285 (“The more support 
the plenary power doctrine accumulated, the more entrenched it became.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (considering a First 
Amendment challenge to Congress’s plenary power in the area of immigration). 
 61. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
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decisions, upholding the exclusion of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen.62  
The Court reinforced the idea that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a 
fundamental act of sovereignty” and extended judicial deference to 
executive officer determinations enforcing Congress’s rules of 
admissibility.63  Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, argued 
that the Court should distinguish between immigration statutes that 
affect only aliens and statutes that affect the rights of U.S. citizens.64  
Despite this potential distinction, the Court ultimately yielded to 
Congress’s plenary power in exclusion.65  Thus, Knauff reinforced the 
Court’s deference to executive branch decisions enforcing the rules 
Congress established for admissibility.66 
The Supreme Court further strengthened Congress’s absolute 
plenary power in questions of admission and exclusion in Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel Mezei.67  The Court⎯acknowledging the 
procedural due process exception to the plenary power 
doctrine⎯reasoned that while aliens in the United States may be 
expelled only after proceedings that conform to traditional standards 
of fairness, “an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on 
different footing.”68  The Court thus concluded that Congress, not 
the judiciary, has the power to dictate an alien’s right to enter the 
United States.69 
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy70 and Galvan v. Press71⎯two 1950s cases 
involving the removal of alleged members of the Communist 
Party⎯the Supreme Court once again acknowledged the procedural 
due process exception in removal proceedings but ultimately 
recognized its own limited role in reviewing immigration statutes.72  
                                                        
 62. Id. at 543. 
 63. See id. at 547 (upholding an executive branch decision to deny an alien’s 
exclusion without a hearing despite the alien’s marriage to a U.S. citizen). 
 64. See id. at 549–50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that a benefit 
extended to a U.S. citizen cannot be taken away without a hearing). 
 65. Id. at 543 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 68. Id. at 212. 
 69. See id. at 210 (“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude 
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control.”).  But see id. at 217 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (taking issue with the extent to which the majority deferred to Congress 
in matters of exclusion and arguing that the alien’s exclusion did not deprive him of 
constitutional rights despite the practical effect of which being two years of detention 
on Ellis Island). 
 70. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 71. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
 72. See id. at 531 (recognizing that executive branch officers must respect 
procedural due process in the enforcement of immigration policies while 
acknowledging that the formulation of those policies is trusted exclusively to 
Congress); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
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In a thorough defense of the justifications for the distinct treatment 
of aliens in the United States and aliens seeking entry to the United 
States, the Court in Harisiades reasoned that by retaining the 
immunities of foreign citizenship and thus avoiding the full burdens 
of allegiance to the United States, aliens had no right to remain in 
the United States.73  This time, Justice Frankfurter concurred and 
summarized the mantra that had become the plenary power doctrine: 
The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of 
aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for 
determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to 
aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, 
have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the 
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.74 
With this deference to Congress’s decision to exclude all past and 
present members of the Communist Party, the Court rejected the 
claims of the resident alien petitioners that their removal violated 
due process.75 
The Court subtly changed its tone when it confronted a similar 
situation two years later in Galvan.  There, the Court was reluctant to 
invoke the plenary power doctrine to affirm the removal of a long-
time permanent resident because of a brief prior membership in the 
Communist Party.76  Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, 
explained that an alien is a “person” as far as the Due Process Clause 
is concerned and that the executive branch must respect the 
procedural safeguards of due process in its enforcement of 
immigration laws.77  In addressing the conflict between Congress’s 
plenary power and its constitutional constraints, Justice Frankfurter 
acknowledged that absent precedent, the Due Process Clause could 
qualify Congress’s discretion in regulating immigration.78  Unable to 
conclude that Congress’s decision to remove Communist Party 
members was unconstitutional because of plenary power precedent, 
                                                        
resident alien has a right to property and liberty and is entitled to due process 
protections). 
 73. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 585–86. 
 74. Id. at 596–97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 591 (majority opinion). 
 76. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523–24, 530, 532 (suggesting that plenary power 
precedent influences the due process protections that might otherwise be afforded 
to foreign nationals but ultimately affirming the deportation of a Mexican citizen 
who had been living in the United States for approximately thirty-six years before an 
immigration officer ordered him deported). 
 77. See id. at 530 (“Much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean 
slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion 
heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and 
deportation of aliens . . . [b]ut the slate is not clean.”). 
 78. Id. at 530–31. 
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Justice Frankfurter noted that Congress’s exclusive authority to 
formulate immigration policy “ha[d] become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as 
any aspect of our government.”79 
The plenary power doctrine was without a doubt “firmly 
imbedded” in the Court’s jurisprudence by the 1970s.80  The Court’s 
characterization of the doctrine, however, as it addressed increasingly 
complex challenges to immigration statutes, has led to confusion 
regarding the doctrine’s boundaries or, more accurately, the lack of 
boundaries.81  Unable to firmly establish the limits of the plenary 
power doctrine but forced to acknowledge the tension between 
constitutional protections and the plenary power, the Court 
established “unusual standards” for constitutional challenges in 
immigration law.82 
For instance, the Court’s decision to uphold the exclusion of a 
prominent Marxist scholar, Ernest Mandel, in Kleindeinst v. Mandel,83 
rested on Congress’s long-established plenary power to exclude and 
prescribe terms of admission free from judicial intervention.84  In 
Kleindeinst, the Court addressed a claim that excluding Mandel 
violated the First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens who would have 
attended his scholarly presentations.85  Rather than relying on the 
traditional constitutional standard that the government can only 
restrict First Amendment rights if the restriction is necessary to 
further a compelling government interest,86 the Court reasoned that 
the executive branch exercised its power to exclude Mandel based on 
a “facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale.87  Thus, because of the 
plenary power doctrine’s influence, “facially legitimate and bona 
fide” became the Court’s standard of scrutiny for constitutional 
challenges to immigration statutes.88 
                                                        
 79. Id. at 531. 
 80. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 291 (stating that beginning in the 1960s, the 
plenary power doctrine left little room to litigate constitutional challenges to 
immigration legislation). 
 81. See id. at 306–07 (noting that courts, anxious to establish boundaries to the 
plenary power doctrine, have devised ways to circumvent plenary power precedent). 
 82. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “merely ‘legitimate’” governmental interests are not sufficient to 
override First Amendment rights). 
 83. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 84. Id. at 766. 
 85. Id. at 754–60. 
 86. Id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s “unusual 
standard” (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., 
concurring))). 
 87. Id. at 770 (majority opinion). 
 88. See generally Motomura, supra note 34 (discussing the increasing application 
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An important constitutional change took place during this era of 
the Court’s plenary power jurisprudence, which could explain the 
subtle shift in the Court’s analysis from avoidance of constitutional 
questions to the use of “unusual” constitutional standards in 
immigration cases.89  The evolution of the standards of scrutiny 
applied in equal protection claims, especially the heightened scrutiny 
applied to classifications based on alienage, was the backdrop for the 
Court’s decisions in the 1970s.90  Despite these developments, the 
plenary power doctrine continued to play an influential role.  For 
example, in Graham v. Richardson,91 the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny to strike down Arizona and Pennsylvania laws prohibiting 
aliens from receiving welfare benefits.92  In contrast, the Court in 
Mathews v. Diaz93 established a different standard for federal law, 
where plenary-power-style deference was maintained.94  In 
distinguishing Mathews from Graham, the Court reasoned that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially 
different from the constitutional provisions controlling the federal 
power over immigration and naturalization.95  The Court held that 
there was no reason to treat aliens differently from citizens at the 
state level.96  At the federal level, however, the Court concluded that 
the political branches’ need to respond flexibly to changing global, 
political, and economic conditions justifies different treatment.97 
Since the 1970s, the Court’s absolute avoidance of constitutional 
questions in immigration, as exemplified in Chae Chan Ping, has 
slowly eroded, but the Court has continued to afford broad deference 
                                                        
of “subconstitutional” and “phantom norms” in immigration cases, which hinder 
the dialogue about traditional constitutional norms in the immigration context). 
 89. Compare Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 428–45 (1998) (plurality opinion) 
(engaging in equal protection analysis to uphold a statute imposing different 
requirements based on gender), with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 
603 (1889) (concluding that a congressional act aimed at excluding Chinese laborers 
was constitutional without engaging in equal protection analysis). 
 90. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (reasoning that 
classifications based on alienage are subject to “close judicial scrutiny”). 
 91. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 92. Id. at 376.  In addition to finding that the laws violated equal protection, the 
Court also held that the laws encroached on Congress’s exclusive power over 
immigration.  Id. at 376–78.  This case arose from a class action case that argued the 
restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause and was preempted by the Social 
Security Act.  Id. at 368.  The Court noted that the power to control immigration is 
vested solely in the federal government.  Id. at 379. 
 93. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 94. See id. at 86–87 (upholding a Medicare eligibility statute requiring permanent 
residence of at least five years to qualify for Medicare benefits). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 85. 
 97. Id. 
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to Congress.98  For instance, in the seminal plenary power case of 
Fiallo v. Bell,99 the Court recognized its limited authority to review 
immigration legislation,100 which some heralded as the Court’s 
acknowledgment that the plenary power doctrine no longer 
functioned as a complete barrier to judicial review.101  In a footnote, 
the Fiallo Court acknowledged a “limited judicial responsibility under 
the Constitution,” even in Congress’s legislation of admission and 
exclusion.102  Despite these acknowledgements of restricted judicial 
review, the Court ultimately affirmed the influence of the plenary 
power doctrine.103  In sum, despite indications throughout the 
twentieth century that the Court was willing to entertain 
constitutional challenges to immigration statutes, it was unable or 
unwilling to sidestep the enduring plenary power precedent. 
3. The modern plenary power doctrine: “Unusual standards” and avoidance 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has continued to apply 
diluted constitutional standards to immigration cases even though it 
has accepted that Congress’s plenary power is limited by the 
Constitution.104  Rather than abandon the doctrine altogether, the 
Court has avoided confronting the doctrine’s scope when reviewing 
constitutional challenges. 
The Supreme Court creatively avoided the plenary power doctrine 
in 1998 when it decided Miller v. Albright.105  In Miller, the Court 
addressed a gender-based equal protection challenge to a provision 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which governed the 
acquisition of citizenship at birth by a child born out of wedlock 
outside the United States.106  The provision contained different 
                                                        
 98. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (noting that there are 
“important constitutional limitations” on Congress’s plenary power); see also Flores-
Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam) (affirming a Ninth Circuit 
decision that Congress has “virtually plenary power” in immigration). 
 99. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 100. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). 
 101. See Motomura, supra note 34, at 608 (arguing that although the Court 
rejected the constitutional claim in Fiallo because of the plenary power doctrine, it 
left the “door slightly ajar” for judicial review). 
 102. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5. 
 103. See infra Part II.C (discussing the statute at issue in Fiallo and the plenary 
power of Congress in immigration policy decisions). 
 104. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (construing an immigration 
statute to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation because allowing 
indefinite detention would “raise serious constitutional concerns”).  See generally 
Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002) 
(arguing that Zadvydas helped set the stage for the abandonment of the plenary 
power doctrine). 
 105. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
 106. Id. at 424 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
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requirements for illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers and 
illegitimate children of U.S. citizen fathers.107  The Court ultimately 
decided that the petitioner lacked standing, but split on whether the 
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fifth 
Amendment.108  Justice Stevens, in an opinion in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist joined, wrote that “important” government interests 
supported the difference in statutory requirements and that the 
provision was “well tailored” to serve those interests.109  In doing so, 
Justice Stevens applied a standard less demanding than the 
traditional constitutional analysis in gender-based classifications, 
which requires an exceedingly persuasive justification and narrow 
tailoring to a government objective.110  In his dissent, Justice Breyer 
argued that instead of applying the plenary power doctrine to justify 
less stringent equal protection standards, the Court should 
distinguish between statutes that implicate the plenary power and 
those that are merely related to immigration or naturalization.111  
Justice Breyer explained that the case did not involve naturalization 
but rather a question of the conferral of citizenship at birth.112  Thus, 
Justice Breyer maintained that the issue did not justify a deferential 
standard of review because it was beyond the scope of Congress’s 
plenary power in naturalization.113 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Supreme Court case law 
has continued to suggest that the plenary power influences the 
standard of judicial review rather than justifies avoidance of 
constitutional questions altogether.  In Nguyen v. INS,114 the Court 
again confronted an equal protection challenge to gender-based 
                                                        
 107. Id. at 428. 
 108. Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the statute did 
not violate equal protection, id. at 445, while Justices O’Connor and Kennedy 
concluded that the petitioner lacked standing, id. at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined in the judgment.  Id. at 452 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer 
dissented, arguing that the statute violated equal protection.  Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); id. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. See id. at 424, 438, 440 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (holding that the statute 
served a “valid” government interest of encouraging the development of a 
relationship between a citizen parent and child while the child is minor, as well as 
fostering ties between a foreign-born child and the United States). 
 110. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (concluding that the 
Virginia Military Institute’s gender-based admissions policy was unconstitutional for 
lack of an exceedingly persuasive justification); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 472 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the gender-based distinctions at question lacked the 
“exceedingly persuasive” support that traditional constitutional analysis requires). 
 111. Miller, 523 U.S. at 478–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 478. 
 113. Id. at 478–79. 
 114. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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classifications in citizenship statutes.115  In determining that the 
statutes were consistent with the constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection, the majority, in a 5–4 decision, held that the statutes were 
justified by important government objectives and were substantially 
related to those objectives.116  Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, reasoned that there was no need to address the issue of the 
plenary power’s influence on the standards of constitutional review 
because the statute satisfied the heightened standard.117 
 In response to Justice Kennedy’s assertion, Justice O’Connor, 
joined in dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued 
that the majority in Nguyen had once again allowed the plenary power 
to justify a standard of review more lenient than the “exceedingly 
persuasive” standard required by the Court’s equal protection 
precedent.118  Justice O’Connor argued that the majority’s willingness 
to search for possible rationalizations for the statute’s gender-based 
classifications and its failure to elaborate on the actual importance of 
the government interests at stake suggested that the majority was 
applying rational basis review while calling it heightened scrutiny.119  
Most importantly, while the majority avoided the plenary power 
question, Justice O’Connor proposed a new understanding of the 
plenary power’s scope.120  Justice O’Connor argued that plenary 
power deference only applies when a person is an alien, not when 
determining a person’s status for purposes of constitutional 
protection.121  She reasoned that determining an individual’s status 
was a question “logically prior” to admission and thus beyond the 
plenary power’s scope.122  Justice O’Connor concluded that because 
Nguyen involved a statute governing the conferral of citizenship at 
                                                        
 115. Id. at 57–58. 
 116. Id. at 58–59, 70. 
 117. Id. at 61. 
 118. See id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the way in which the 
majority explained and applied heightened scrutiny was “a stranger to” the Court’s 
precedent). 
 119. See id. at 78–80 (maintaining that the majority, contrary to the requirements 
of heightened scrutiny, failed to inquire into the actual purposes of the statute as 
illustrated by the fact that the Immigration and Nationality Services advanced 
purposes quite different from those that the majority found).  The dissent argued 
that the majority’s “hypothesized rationale” was insufficient under heightened 
scrutiny and more akin to the justifications permitted under rational basis review.  Id. 
at 75, 84.  The dissent ultimately concluded that the statute violated equal 
protection, most importantly because of the insufficiency of the fit between the 
statute’s “discriminatory means and the asserted end.”  Id. at 74, 80. 
 120. See id. at 94, 96 (arguing that that the plaintiffs in Nguyen could surmount the 
hurdle of plenary power deference because their situation was readily distinguishable 
from Fiallo, the pivotal case in plenary power deference). 
 121. Id. at 96. 
 122. Id. 
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birth, not the admission of aliens, traditional standards of equal 
protection review should apply.123 
In 2008, an evenly split Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Flores-Villar124 to apply a similarly 
deferential standard to a question of U.S. citizenship.125  Ruben 
Flores-Villar, a Mexican national, was arrested for his presence in the 
United States after deportation.126  In his defense, Flores-Villar 
claimed that he was not deportable because he had acquired U.S. 
citizenship through his father, a naturalized U.S. citizen.127  His 
application for a certificate of citizenship had been denied on the 
grounds that his father, who was sixteen when Flores-Villar was born, 
had not been present in the United States for five years after his 
fourteenth birthday,128 as the statute required.129  Flores-Villar 
brought an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, challenging the INA’s five-year residency 
requirement for U.S. citizen fathers to confer citizenship on children 
born out of wedlock⎯a requirement the statute did not impose on 
U.S. citizen mothers.130  The U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California, citing Nguyen, acknowledged that it was unclear 
whether a lesser degree of scrutiny applied to gender-based 
classifications in the immigration context but concluded that there 
was a need for special judicial deference.131  The district court held 
that Flores-Villar’s equal protection claim failed because there 
appeared to be a “bona fide reason” for applying different physical 
presence requirements to unwed U.S. citizen mothers and fathers.132 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit bolstered the deferential standard 
applied by the district court, stating that legislative distinctions in 
immigration do not need to be as “carefully tuned” as the domestic 
                                                        
 123. Id. at 97 (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
 124. 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 131 S. 
Ct. 2312 (2011). 
 125. Id. at 996. 
 126. See id. at 994 (stating that Flores-Villar had been previously convicted of 
importation of marijuana, two counts of illegal entry into the United States, and had 
been removed from the United States pursuant to removal orders on numerous 
occasions). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. INA § 18(u)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1401a(g) (2006). 
 130. Id. at 993. 
 131. United States v. Flores-Villar, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2007) 
(citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001)), aff’d, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), 
aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011). 
 132. Id. at 1165. 
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context requires.133  The Ninth Circuit dispensed with the need to 
determine whether a lesser standard of review is required in plenary 
power cases.134  The court then concluded that the connection 
between the statutory requirement and Congress’s interests in 
minimizing the risks of statelessness and assuring a link between an 
unwed citizen father and a child born out of wedlock was “sufficiently 
persuasive” to survive constitutional challenge.135  Thus, in an 
attempt to apply both intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review, 
the Ninth Circuit applied a standard less demanding than the 
traditional constitutional analysis in gender-based claims.136  While 
avoiding the question of the plenary power’s influence on the level of 
scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plenary power to influence its 
application of traditional constitutional standards.137  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s deferential standard in a 4–4 per 
curiam decision.138 
The modern plenary power decisions demonstrate the continuing 
tension between plenary power precedent and the constitutional 
safeguards afforded to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals.139  The 
Supreme Court failed to clarify the plenary power’s scope when it 
avoided the question of the plenary power’s influence in Miller, 
Nguyen, and most recently, Flores-Villar.  While the Court’s decision to 
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Flores-Villar could 
signify the “steady erosion” of the plenary power doctrine,140 it is 
likely that this erosion will leave the courts to grapple with the 
plenary power doctrine in its modern form141—a power that 
influences the way that constitutional standards are applied to 
immigration statutes.  As the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the 
                                                        
 133. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 997 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791–93, 799 
n.8 (1977)). 
 134. Id. at 996 n.2. 
 135. Id. at 996. 
 136. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based classifications). 
 137. See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 996 (allowing the plenary power to influence the 
court’s determination of whether the statute’s means sufficiently fit its objectives). 
 138. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam). 
 139. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 806–07 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(advocating for a distinction between constitutional challenges brought by U.S. 
citizens and those brought by aliens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
734 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (arguing that different rights should be afforded 
to aliens domiciled in the United States and those seeking entry). 
 140. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 936–37 (predicting that the plenary power 
doctrine will not be abolished by the Supreme Court cleaning the slate once and for 
all, but will instead be worn down little by little through court-made exceptions and 
qualifications). 
 141. See id. at 937 (arguing that courts will likely end up with an “emasculated” 
version of the plenary power doctrine, or a “PPD-lite”). 
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plenary power doctrine threatens to drive the doctrine’s influence 
underground in judicial review,142 Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller 
and Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen are reminders that 
distinctions within immigration law are possible and that the plenary 
power doctrine can be confronted and more clearly defined. 
B. DOMA and Its Application in Immigration 
In 1996, Congress passed DOMA in a wave of panic that states 
would begin to recognize same-sex marriage.143  DOMA was passed in 
a climate inimical to gay and lesbian rights, when the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick144 condoned state laws 
criminalizing private homosexual conduct.145  DOMA’s supporters 
argued that it merely reflected a definition of marriage that had been 
the core of the traditional family for over 5,000 years,146 a definition 
that had until then been so obvious that it did not require 
explanation in the myriad statutes referencing marriage.147  Despite 
the arguments of DOMA’s opponents that it exceeded Congress’s 
constitutional authority,148 DOMA followed in the footsteps of 
policies like “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.”149  More recently, as the tide of 
                                                        
 142. See Nina Pillard, Comment, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS:  A 
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 836 (2002) (arguing that while the 
Court may be backing away from the plenary power doctrine, in that it has not 
chosen to explicitly weaken it in recent case law, it may be submerging the doctrine 
and creating a host of new problems in constitutional challenges to immigration 
statutes). 
 143. See E.J. Graff, 15 Years After DOMA, Hearing Reveals a Nation Transformed, 
ATLANTIC (July 20, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2011/07/15-years-after-doma-hearing-reveals-a-nation-transformed/242273/ 
(attributing the motivation for DOMA to the Supreme Court of Hawaii’s decision in 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993), which federal lawmakers feared would 
“open the door to same-sex marriages in that state”).  In Lewin, Hawaii’s highest 
court held that the state’s statutory ban on same-sex marriages was subject to strict 
scrutiny and remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the law met 
that burden.  852 P.2d at 74. 
 144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 145. See id. at 196 (concluding that state anti-sodomy laws were constitutional in 
light of the belief that homosexual sodomy is “immoral and unacceptable”).  Today, 
by contrast, rights activists face a more hospitable political and social climate.  See 
David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 187, 187–88 (discussing the successes in the gay marriage context in the past 
four years, including its legalization in several states and public recognition by the 
President and Vice President, as well as the executive’s newly adopted position that it 
will no longer defend DOMA). 
 146. 142 CONG. REC. 22,442 (1996) (statement of Sen. William Philip Gramm). 
 147. See id. at 22,440 (statement of Sen. Donald Nickles) (“[T]hese provisions 
simply reaffirm what is already known . . . .”). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 22,439 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (arguing that 
Congress cannot add or subtract from the Full Faith and Credit Clause and thus that 
DOMA is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power). 
 149. See Graff, supra note 143 (describing the “moral panic” during the time of 
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gay and lesbian rights has shifted,150 DOMA has become the subject 
of attacks at both judicial and political levels.151 
Unlike DOMA, the INA’s definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” 
do not address same-sex relationships, despite Congress having 
redrafted and amended the INA over 100 times in the statute’s 
history.152  The INA defines spouse only by what it is not—stating that 
an individual is not a spouse if the parties were not physically present 
at the marriage ceremony, unless the marriage has been otherwise 
consummated.153  In the 1952 iteration, the INA contained a 
provision aimed at preventing the admission of homosexuals, but 
Congress has since removed that provision.154  DOMA, however, 
establishes a federal definition of marriage: 
In determining the meaning of any act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.155 
DOMA does not reference immigration, nor did Congress 
expressly contemplate immigration during the Act’s passage.156  
While the INA was not amended to reflect DOMA’s federal 
definition, DOMA applies to the immigration context through 
administrative agency and consular interpretations of “marriage” and 
“spouse” at the adjudicatory stage of immigration petitions and 
applications.157  Thus, DOMA effectively bars a foreign national from 
                                                        
DOMA’s passage, including Congress’s passage of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy 
in 1993, the Hawaii lawsuit, and the passage of several state “Defense of Marriage” 
laws and constitutional amendments). “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”⎯the United States’ 
official policy on homosexuals in the military from 1994 until 2011⎯barred openly 
gay or bisexual individuals from serving in the military.  See generally 10 U.S.C. § 654 
(2006) (repealed 2011). 
 150. See supra note 145 (discussing the shift in the political and social treatment of 
homosexual rights). 
 151. See Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13 (announcing the Department of 
Justice’s stance that it will no longer defend DOMA); Obama Supports Repeal of Gay-
Marriage Ban, THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2011, 2:40 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2011/07/obama-supports-repeal-of-gay-marriage-ban/242197/ 
(discussing President Obama’s support for the Repeal of Marriage Act introduced in 
the Senate in July 2011, which would repeal DOMA). 
 152. INA § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006); see also Titshaw, supra note 
6, at 559 (suggesting that Congress intended to leave “marriage” undefined in the 
INA). 
 153. INA § 101(a)(35). 
 154. See infra Part II.C (detailing the 1952 INA’s ban on homosexual admission). 
 155. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified 
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 156. 142 CONG. REC. 22,437–63 (1996). 
 157. This Comment focuses on DOMA at the adjudicatory stage of immigrant visa 
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immigrating to the United States on the basis of a same-sex 
relationship with a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.158 
Ordinarily, a U.S. citizen or permanent resident can petition to 
legalize a foreign national spouse using United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-130, Petition for Alien 
Relative.159  In the case of a spouse of a U.S. citizen, an I-130 petition 
establishes the foreign national’s immediate relative status for 
purposes of visa eligibility.160  These petitions are a necessary step in 
marriage-based immigrant visa or adjustment of status applications 
and are adjudicated by USCIS regardless of whether the foreign 
national will ultimately seek permanent residency through 
adjustment of status within the United States or by way of an 
immigrant visa through a consulate abroad.161  If a USCIS adjudicator 
finds that the facts stated on the petition are accurate and establish a 
qualifying relationship between the U.S. citizen and foreign national, 
the petition is approved.162  An approved petition, however, does not 
guarantee the foreign national’s admission into the United States; the 
foreign national must also apply for an immigrant visa abroad or for 
adjustment of status within the United States after the petition is 
approved.163  Even if an immigrant visa petition is approved, a 
consular official at the port of entry or an immigration officer 
                                                        
petitions.  DOMA, however, influences eligibility for immigration benefits in a variety 
of circumstances, such as eligibility for certain types of relief from removal that 
require a showing of hardship to a U.S. citizen’s spouse.  See, e.g., INA § 
240A(b)(1)(D) (allowing discretionary relief from removal where, in addition to 
other requirements, a foreign national’s removal would result in extremely unusual 
hardship to a U.S. citizen’s spouse). 
 158. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL—
REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION, ch. 21.3(I) Petition for a Spouse [hereinafter 
ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL], available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010Vgn
VCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd
190aRCRD&CH=afm (instructing immigration adjudicators that DOMA’s federal 
definition of marriage controls whether a marriage is valid for purposes of 
immigration); 9 U.S. DEP’T OF ST., FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 40.1 n.1 (2011), available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86920.pdf (instructing consular 
officers that same-sex marriages cannot be recognized for immigration purposes 
because DOMA determines that these relationships do not “meet the Federal 
definition of marriage”). 
 159. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1996). 
 160. Id.  Congress has established a quota system for immigrant visas depending 
on the basis or qualifying relationship upon which the visa is issued.  INA § 201.  
Foreign nationals classified as “immediate relatives” are exempt from these quotas 
and are not required to wait for an available visa.  Id. § 201(b).  Immediate relative 
status is thus a highly coveted immigrant visa classification.  An “immediate relative” 
is defined as the child, spouse, or parent of a citizen of the United States.  Id. § 
201(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 161. See INA § 204 (detailing “an investigation of the facts in each case”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
PORTMESS.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:22 PM 
2012] UNTIL THE PLENARY POWER DO US PART 1847 
adjudicating an application for adjustment of status ultimately makes 
the decision to admit a foreign national based on a review of the 
individual foreign national’s admissibility.164 
Immigration officials usually consider three factors when 
determining whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes: 
first, the validity of the marriage where celebrated,165 second, the 
evidence of the bona fides of the marital relationship,166 and third, 
the existence of a categorical public policy exception regarding who 
may marry whom.167  Historically, the rule in both interstate and 
immigration related marriage recognition has been that a marriage 
valid in the state or country where it was celebrated is valid 
everywhere.168  Conflict of laws principles in marriage recognition, 
however, allow an exception to this general rule where the marriage 
violates the “strong public policy” of another state.169  The BIA and 
federal courts have sometimes recognized similar public policy 
exceptions in applying the INA.170 
Based on DOMA’s federal definition of marriage, USCIS advises 
immigration adjudicators that same-sex marriages are not valid 
marital relationships for purposes of the I-130 petition.171  For foreign 
nationals in same-sex marriages who lack any other basis for 
immigrating to the United States, DOMA effectively denies their 
                                                        
 164. Id.; see also id. § 212 (containing the grounds of inadmissibility). 
 165. See id. § 216 (pertaining to the removal of conditions on permanent 
residence for foreign national spouses). 
 166. Id. § 204; id. § 216. 
 167. See Titshaw, supra note 6, at 549–50 (describing the evolution of rules for 
marriage recognition in immigration, and stating that standards for recognizing the 
marital relationship are the result of immigration cases “decided in a piecemeal, 
case-specific manner”). 
 168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see also 
Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy 
Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 105 
(2010) (“All states follow the venerable choice of law rule of marriage recognition, 
which holds that a marriage is considered valid in any jurisdiction if it was valid in the 
state of celebration, even if it would not be valid in the state where recognition is 
sought.”). 
 169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see Nevada v. 
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (establishing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not require a state to violate its own legitimate public policy by applying 
another state’s law); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(concluding that Florida was not required to apply another state’s same-sex marriage 
law because it conflicted with Florida’s public policy of opposing same-sex marriage). 
 170. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding a public 
policy exception to the general rule of marriage recognition precluding the 
immigration of a foreign national in a same-sex marriage long before the passage of 
DOMA).  See generally Titshaw, supra note 6, at 579–88 (discussing the federal public 
policy exceptions historically recognized under the INA). 
 171. See ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 158, at Ch. 21.3(2)(I) (advising 
immigration adjudicators that a marriage’s validity for immigration purposes is a 
matter of federal law governed by DOMA). 
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admission.172  Given DOMA’s uncertain constitutional footing and 
Attorney General Holder’s letter to Congress stating that the 
executive branch will no longer defend DOMA, courts are employing 
a variety of ostensibly ameliorative measures to counter DOMA’s 
effects at the adjudicatory stage of immigration benefits.173  In some 
cases, courts have put removal proceedings on hold, others have 
reopened cases sua sponte to allow applications for relief where 
DOMA previously barred same-sex immigration benefits, and still 
others have closed cases altogether.174  As uncertainty remains while 
challenges to DOMA’s effect on binational same-sex couples mount, 
clarifying the plenary power doctrine’s influence on standards of 
judicial scrutiny of DOMA in immigration becomes increasingly 
important. 
II. CONGRESS’S PLENARY POWER IS LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DOMA’S 
APPLICATION IN IMMIGRATION IS BEYOND THE POWER’S SCOPE 
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to the plenary power 
doctrine, since its decision in Miller, demonstrates that a nuanced 
understanding of Congress’s power in immigration and the limits of 
plenary power deference is possible.175  The Court’s willingness to 
engage in constitutional analysis, albeit colored by the influence of 
the plenary power doctrine, is evidence that the plenary power is no 
longer a barrier against the judicial review of all questions 
immigration-related.176  This Comment recommends a substantive 
framework for understanding the scope of the plenary power that 
would limit the doctrine to questions of admission, removal, 
naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions.  This limited 
substantive framework will illuminate the boundaries of the plenary 
power doctrine in general.  This Comment further argues that, given 
this limited substantive framework, DOMA applies to an area of 
immigration law beyond the plenary power doctrine’s scope.  Thus, 
traditional constitutional standards should apply to DOMA-related 
                                                        
 172. Id.; see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (describing the case of a 
foreign national who was denied an immigrant visa because DOMA does not 
recognize his relationship). 
 173. See Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13 (articulating the unconstitutionality 
of DOMA). 
 174. See Semple, supra note 14 (describing a case where an alien’s deportation was 
cancelled after he was denied immigration benefits because of DOMA). 
 175. See supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the modern plenary power case law from 
Miller to Flores-Villar as essentially allowing Congress’s plenary power to influence the 
standard of judicial review rather than justifying the avoidance of constitutional 
questions). 
 176. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the diluted constitutional standards applied by 
the Supreme Court in Nguyen and Flores-Villar). 
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challenges in the immigration context. 
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Should Be Limited to Questions of 
Admission, Removal, Naturalization, and Immigration Policy Distinctions 
A basic framework for understanding the plenary power’s scope is 
necessary in light of the myriad complexities of immigration law and 
the difficulty of reconciling these complexities with constitutional 
requirements.  This Comment suggests a limited substantive 
framework that would confine plenary power deference to four 
substantive areas of immigration law: admission, removal, 
naturalization, and practical immigration policy distinctions.  The 
Supreme Court routinely applies plenary power deference in varying 
degrees to cases involving these four categories, but immigration-
related issues that do not fall into one of these categories may be 
beyond the scope of the plenary power.177 
The Supreme Court’s increasingly refined approach to 
constitutional questions in each of these four substantive areas is 
evidence that courts are capable of making the distinctions in 
immigration law necessary to employ a substantive framework for 
plenary power analysis.  This refined approach is a departure from 
the tradition, established through twentieth century plenary power 
case law, which extended great deference to Congress.178  Thus, 
rather than approaching immigration as a nebulous concept over 
which Congress has unqualified power, courts would first inquire into 
whether the issue fits squarely into one of the substantive categories 
traditionally afforded some degree of plenary power deference.179  
While the Supreme Court does not currently employ a limited 
substantive framework in plenary power cases, Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent in Nguyen and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller suggest that the 
Court may entertain such a framework.180  In light of the increasing 
number of constitutional challenges to immigration statutes and the 
DOMA issue in particular, a narrowed and disciplined approach to 
                                                        
 177. See infra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional 
standards that apply in immigration cases when the plenary power is not implicated). 
 178. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 306 (“So great has been the power of the 
word ‘immigration’ that its mere mention has been enough to propel the Court into 
a cataleptic trance.”). 
 179. See infra Parts II.A.1–4 (discussing each of the four categories traditionally 
granted plenary power deference). 
 180. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen, where 
she attempted to distinguish between citizenship and the questions logically prior to 
citizenship, and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller, where he attempted to distinguish 
between naturalization and citizenship at birth); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing 
Justice O’Connor’s logically prior standard in the context of immigrant visa 
petitions). 
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the plenary power is necessary. 
1. Admission 
In cases involving admission, the Supreme Court has routinely 
deemed Congress’s plenary power to be absolute.181  Since Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, the Court has afforded extraordinary deference 
to the rules that Congress establishes for the admission of foreign 
nationals.182  The Court laid the foundation for this principle in 
Nishimura Ekiu based on notions of sovereignty and self-
preservation.183 
In the long line of plenary power cases, the Court has never 
questioned Congress’s power to determine rules for admission.184  
Reciting what has become the plenary power mantra in cases of 
admission, Justice Powell in Fiallo acknowledged that “‘over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” 185  This reasoning 
has persisted throughout the doctrine’s case law involving questions 
of admission.186 
2. Removal 
In cases involving removal, the Supreme Court now recognizes the 
                                                        
 181. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing, even in dissent, that Congress has complete legislative power over the 
admission of aliens); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that recent 
decisions had not departed from the well-established rule that Congress’s power to 
exclude aliens is a fundamental sovereign attribute); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (emphasizing that Congress’s power to exclude 
aliens is not “open to controversy”). 
 182. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting the long line of plenary power cases 
reinforcing the rule that Congress’s power to exclude aliens is inherent to 
sovereignty); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) 
(“[R]espondent’s right to enter the United States depends on the congressional will 
. . . .” (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590–91 (1952))); United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (explaining that 
whatever the rules of deportation may be, there is no question that judicial review is 
limited in cases of exclusion). 
 183. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an 
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as 
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”). 
 184. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (stating that since the 
Court in Chae Chan Ping articulated the principle that the power to exclude is 
inherent in sovereignty and is to be exercised exclusively by the political branches, 
the “Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion”). 
 185. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766; Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). 
 186. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging 
Congress’s complete legislative power over the admission of aliens). 
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constraints of procedural due process on plenary power deference.187  
While the Court in Harisiades issued a stern denial of due process 
claims presented by an alien facing deportation,188 by the time the 
Court decided Galvan, it readily acknowledged that an alien is a 
“person” for purposes of the Due Process Clause and that the 
executive branch must respect procedural due process safeguards 
when enforcing immigration laws.189 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Court had accepted the 
procedural due process exception in removal cases.  In 2001, the 
Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis,190 read an immigration statute 
“in light of the Constitution’s demands” and concluded that the 
statute contained an implicit “reasonable time” limitation on post-
removal detention.191  Thus, the Court now recognizes that 
Congress’s power to determine who will be removed is subject to 
certain “important constitutional limitations” despite the removal 
authority being firmly established within Congress’s plenary power.192 
3. Naturalization 
Courts have recognized similarly limited constitutional protections 
in cases involving naturalization.193  When a case directly implicates 
Congress’s naturalization authority, the Supreme Court has afforded 
Congress broad deference.194  Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen 
and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller, however, follow the trend of 
                                                        
 187. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 926, 931–32 (pointing to Yamataya v. Fisher as 
evidence that the Supreme Court has generally guaranteed at least one constitutional 
right—due process—in immigration cases). 
 188. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952) (concluding that 
an alien’s ability to remain in the United States is a matter of permission and 
tolerance and that courts have consistently sustained the government’s power to 
“terminate its hospitality”). 
 189. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (recognizing procedural due 
process safeguards even though the “formulation” of immigration policies is 
“entrusted exclusively to Congress”). 
 190. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 191. Id. at 682, 689. 
 192. Compare id. at 695 (stating that Congress’s plenary power to “create 
immigration law” is “subject to important constitutional limitations”), with Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that the right of a nation to 
deport foreigners is “absolute and unqualified”). 
 193. See Price v. INS, 941 F.2d 878, 883–84 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that once 
an alien gains admission and establishes ties as a permanent resident, his 
constitutional status changes but that constitutional protections may be limited), op. 
withdrawn, substituted op., on reh’g, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.1992); see also Berenyi v. Dist. 
Dir., 385 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1967) (noting the heavy burden on an alien to establish 
eligibility for citizenship). 
 194. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883–84 (1988) (limiting federal courts’ 
authority to confer citizenship to “strict compliance with the terms of an authorizing 
statute”). 
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increasingly inventive techniques to limit plenary power deference.195  
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggests that while Congress’s 
plenary power over naturalization is absolute, the extension of this 
power to questions logically prior to naturalization could be subject 
to traditional judicial inquiry.196 
The Court’s willingness to entertain constitutional challenges to 
citizenship statutes in Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-Villar is evidence that 
the plenary power is no longer a barrier to constitutional review of all 
questions immigration-related.197  Despite this development in the 
constitutional analysis of immigration statutes, naturalization remains 
firmly imbedded in Congress’s plenary power.198 
4. Immigration policy distinctions 
The fourth category of cases where deference to Congress’s plenary 
power has been nearly absolute consists of challenges to Congress’s 
policy choices distinguishing among aliens for the purposes of 
federal benefits or immigration preference classifications.  
Challenges in this category involve Congress’s policy decisions to 
extend benefits to some but not all foreign nationals.199  The Court in 
Mathews characterized these congressional decisions not as 
constitutional issues but as policy choices where Congress must draw 
a line in the allocation of benefits to aliens.200  The Mathews Court 
thus justified residency requirements for federal benefits, noting that 
those who fall just to one side of the line will always have cause to 
                                                        
 195.  See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 936–37 (describing the steadily accumulating 
case law demonstrating courts’ inventive exceptions and qualifications to the plenary 
power doctrine). 
 196. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96–97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that plenary power deference only applies when a person is an alien, not 
when determining the person’s status for purposes of constitutional protection); see 
also supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s logically prior analysis). 
 197. Compare Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60 (engaging in equal protection analysis of a 
citizenship statute), and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that Congress’s 
plenary power is “subject to important constitutional limitations,” particularly that of 
procedural due process during removal), with Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711–13 
(concluding that Congress’s absolute power to exclude and expel aliens precluded 
judicial review), and Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) 
(showing that the plenary power was an absolute bar to concluding that Congress’s 
legislation in immigration, the Chinese Exclusion Act, was unconstitutional). 
 198. See, e.g., Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (acknowledging that 
Congress’s broad power over naturalization and immigration allows for rules that 
would be unacceptable if applied to U.S. citizens). 
 199. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799–800 (1977) (holding that Congress’s 
decision not to extend preferential status to the illegitimate children of U.S. citizen 
fathers was constitutional); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (upholding 
residency requirements for eligibility for federal Medicare benefits). 
 200. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81–83 (upholding a five-year residency requirement 
to obtain permanent resident status). 
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complain.201  In the case of preference category classifications for 
immigrant visas, the Court has made similar references to Congress’s 
authority to make policy choices distinguishing among eligible 
aliens.202  For instance, the Fiallo Court looked to legislative history to 
determine that Congress made an explicit policy choice not to 
extend preferential status to all aliens, and thus that Congress’s 
decision was insulated from judicial review.203 
In summary, small variations in the level of judicial review exist 
even in these four areas of recognized plenary power:  admission, 
removal, naturalization, and immigration policy distinctions. As the 
Court’s precedent demonstrates, Congress’s plenary power is at its 
zenith and may wholly preclude judicial scrutiny in questions of 
admission.  In contrast, the plenary power doctrine permits limited 
judicial review in cases of removal, naturalization, and policy choices.  
While these categories are themselves quite broad, employing this 
limited substantive framework of plenary power case law will allow 
courts to recognize when immigration-related questions do not fall 
within the plenary power’s scope.  This nuanced approach will permit 
courts to apply non-deferential standards in constitutional challenges 
to immigration statutes when the issue is beyond the scope of the 
plenary power doctrine. 
B. DOMA Does Not Apply to Immigrant Visa Petitions Through Congress’s 
Plenary Power Over Admission, Removal, or Naturalization 
A petition for immediate relative classification for a same-sex 
spouse is not an issue of naturalization or removal.204  Thus, if plenary 
power deference were to reach this stage of the immigration process, 
it would be through Congress’s authority over decisions of admission 
or policy distinctions.205  This Comment argues that by employing the 
accepted understanding of the difference between visa petitions and 
admission, along with Justice O’Connor’s nuanced approach to the 
plenary power’s scope in her dissent in Nguyen, the visa petition stage 
of the immigration process is beyond the plenary power’s scope.  
Furthermore, Congress did not intend to make a rule for admission 
                                                        
 201. Id. at 83. 
 202. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798 (stating that the issue of which aliens receive 
preferential status is a policy question entrusted to the political branches). 
 203. See id. at 799 n.9 (noting that the challenged distinction was addressed in a 
prior bill proposed in Congress); infra Part II.C (discussing the policy choice at issue 
in Fiallo). 
 204. See supra notes 28–29 (explaining naturalization and removal). 
 205. See supra note 27 (defining admission); see also supra Part II.A.4 (explaining 
Congress’s plenary power in immigration policy). 
PORTMESS.OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:22 PM 
1854 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1825 
or a policy choice in immigration when it enacted DOMA.  Thus, the 
plenary power cannot shield DOMA’s application in immigration 
from traditional constitutional review. 
1. Immigrant visa classification versus admission 
In order to establish an immediate relative relationship with a 
foreign national spouse, a U.S. citizen must file USCIS Form I-130.206  
Once this relationship is established and the I-130 petition is 
approved, a visa for the foreign national spouse is immediately 
available pending the approval of an immigrant visa application.207  
The I-130 petition and immigrant visa portions of the process are 
necessary precursors to the foreign national’s admission or 
adjustment of status;208 however, determining a foreign national’s 
eligibility for an immigrant visa classification on a form I-130 is 
distinct from a decision of admission. 
The BIA has recognized the distinction between admissibility and 
adjudication of a visa petition.  For example, in a case before the BIA 
in 1959,209 a U.S. citizen petitioned for quota-exempt status on behalf 
of her foreign national spouse.210  Her spouse, however, had 
numerous criminal and fraud issues that would have rendered him 
excludable—or inadmissible, as the modern terminology would 
describe him.211  U.S. immigration authorities sought to deny the 
foreign national’s visa petition on the grounds that he would 
ultimately be found inadmissible, and thus ineligible for a visa.212  
The BIA found that because the visa petition established the requisite 
immediate relative relationship and U.S. citizenship of the foreign 
national’s spouse, the visa petition should be approved 
notwithstanding the admissibility issues.213  The BIA reasoned that the 
“sole concern for the [visa petition] procedure is eligibility for the 
status claimed” and that a review of admissibility is left for a consular 
or immigration service officer at the immigrant visa or adjustment of 
status stage.214  Maintaining that this distinction safeguards the 
foreign national’s opportunity for a hearing on his admission in front 
                                                        
 206. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1996); see supra Part I.B (discussing the general filing and 
adjudication procedures for the immediate relative classification). 
 207. See INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006) (stating that immediate relatives 
are quota-exempt). 
 208. Id. § 201(b). 
 209. O—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 295 (B.I.A. 1959). 
 210. Id. at 295. 
 211. Id. at 296. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 297. 
 214. Id. 
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of a consular or immigration service officer, the BIA concluded that 
approval of a visa petition does not guarantee admission and that the 
two steps are necessarily distinct.215 
The INA’s statutory scheme governing admissibility reinforces the 
distinction between admission and eligibility for immediate relative 
visa classification.  Section 212 of the INA contains the grounds of 
inadmissibility, ranging from public health concerns to terrorist 
activity.216  This section states that a foreign national is inadmissible if 
she does not have a valid and unexpired immigrant visa.217  Section 
212 does not state that ineligibility for an immigrant visa renders a 
foreign national inadmissible.218  Moreover, the factors and rules for 
adjudicating an I-130 petition based on a marital relationship with a 
U.S. citizen are contained in section 204 of the INA, separate and 
distinct from the section governing inadmissibility.219  Thus, while 
section 212 establishes that a valid immigrant visa is necessary for a 
determination of admissibility, adjudication of an immigrant visa 
petition is statutorily distinct from admissibility.220 
To seek admission as an immigrant, a foreign national must 
establish her eligibility for the given visa classification and obtain the 
visa.221  These steps are necessary precursors to admission and are 
distinct from an immigration officer’s decision to admit a particular 
foreign national.222 
2. Admission and Justice O’Connor’s logically prior standard for the  plenary 
 power’s scope 
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance on the precise 
boundaries of the plenary power doctrine, Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
in Nguyen provides a useful standard for defining the plenary power’s 
scope.  Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggested that steps 
logically prior to admission may not be subject to plenary power 
deference.223  Justice O’Connor attempted to distinguish between 
                                                        
 215. See id. at 297–98 (approving visa petition but warning that the approval did 
not assure admission to the United States). 
 216. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006). 
 217. Id. § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(l). 
 218. Id. § 212. 
 219. Id. § 204. 
 220. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0012, PETITION 
FOR ALIEN RELATIVE (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-
130.pdf (containing questions regarding the citizenship of the petitioning spouse 
and the facts of the qualifying relationship but not questions of admissibility). 
 221. See INA § 101 (classifying an alien without a valid visa as inadmissible). 
 222. See supra Part I.B (detailing the distinct steps in the process for seeking 
admission as an immigrant). 
 223. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 96 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
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naturalization⎯over which Congress’s plenary power is firmly 
established⎯and a determination of whether a foreign national is a 
U.S. citizen.224  Her dissent argued that a case must be within the 
boundaries of the plenary power’s scope in order to receive 
deference.225  Employing this reasoning, eligibility for a visa 
classification can also be characterized as a step logically prior to 
admission.226  Just as determining whether an individual is a citizen is 
a step logically prior to naturalization, determining whether an 
individual is an immediate relative⎯a spouse in the case of 
DOMA⎯is a step logically prior to admission.227  As Justice O’Connor 
concluded in the citizenship question in Nguyen,228 the ordinary 
standards of constitutional analysis should thus apply to challenges to 
DOMA’s application in the I-130 visa petition process. 
Justice O’Connor is not the first Supreme Court justice to suggest a 
substantive limitation on plenary power.  In his dissent to Miller, 
Justice Breyer stated that conferral of citizenship at birth was distinct 
from naturalization⎯an area of the law over which Congress has 
plenary power.229  Justice Breyer’s dissent in Miller and Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen suggest that arguments attempting to 
narrow the plenary power doctrine’s scope are reoccurring in the 
Court’s modern plenary power jurisprudence.230  With the Court’s 
avoidance of the plenary power question in Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-
Villar, Justice O’Connor advanced one potential understanding of the 
plenary power’s scope.231  While the majority has yet to adopt Justice 
O’Connor’s logically prior standard, the equally divided decision to 
affirm Flores-Villar could be evidence that the Court continues to 
disagree on the plenary power’s scope in immigration cases, even 
after Justice O’Connor’s retirement from the Court in 2006.232  If the 
                                                        
that a predicate to applying Fiallo-style deference is that the individuals involved are 
in fact aliens). 
 224. Id. at 96. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See supra Part II.B.1 (establishing that a visa petition is a distinct prior step to 
admission). 
 227. See supra Parts I.B and II.B.1 (discussing the immediate relative 
determination in the immigration process and establishing that it is a precursor to 
admission). 
 228. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Albright, 
523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 229. Miller, 523 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 230. See supra note 139 (addressing dissenting opinions that attempted to narrow 
the scope of the plenary power). 
 231. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 232. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam); see supra 
Part I.A.3 (discussing the Ninth Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Flores-Villar). 
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Court accepts the distinctions between naturalization and the steps 
logically prior, or between naturalization and citizenship at birth, it 
could also recognize the distinction between admission and the 
logically prior question of immigrant visa classification eligibility.233 
Distinguishing between admission and the logically prior step of 
assessing the qualifying relationship for purposes of an immigrant 
visa petition would require confronting the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Fiallo.  The Court in Fiallo upheld a statute governing eligibility for 
preferential status for an immigrant visa by citing Congress’s plenary 
power over the admission of foreign nationals.234  While Congress’s 
plenary power over admission is firmly established,235 the Court has 
also long accepted that admission and establishing the necessary 
qualifying relationship for preferential status are separate and distinct 
considerations.236  Moreover, the Court decided Fiallo during the era 
of evolving equal protection standards and prior to the Court’s 
willingness to scrutinize equal protection challenges in 
immigration.237  Thus, the Court’s conflation of visa petition eligibility 
and admission in Fiallo may be another example of the dangers of the 
poorly defined plenary power. 
While plenary power precedent is formidable, it no longer serves as 
a barrier to the distinctions in immigration law that may narrow its 
scope and influence.  In the formative years of the Supreme Court’s 
plenary power jurisprudence, the Court interpreted the doctrine to 
be a strict limitation on judicial review, often foreclosing thoughtful 
analysis of constitutional questions in cases involving immigration.238  
In Galvan v. Press, the Court acknowledged the due process 
limitations on the plenary power’s reach,239 and later, in Zadvydas, the 
Court explicitly recognized the constitutional limitations of the 
plenary power doctrine in cases of removal.240  In the past two 
                                                        
 233. But see Legomsky, supra note 34, at 298 (“The distinction between 
distinctions would either swallow the plenary power doctrine entirely or give the 
courts an unfettered discretion whether to invoke it.”). 
 234. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798–99 (1977). 
 235. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the broad deference afforded to Congress in 
the admission of foreign nationals). 
 236. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing BIA precedent separating the adjudication of 
immigrant visa petitions and decisions of admissibility as well as the distinct statutory 
schemes governing the two steps of the immigration process). 
 237. See supra Parts I.A.2–3 (emphasizing the importance of evolving equal 
protection standards to the subsequent developments in the constitutional analysis of 
immigration statutes). 
 238. See supra Part I.A.1 (analyzing the Court’s avoidance of constitutional 
questions in early plenary power cases). 
 239. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the Court’s limited recognition of an alien’s 
procedural due process safeguards). 
 240. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 695 (2001) (construing an 
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decades, and with the recent decision to affirm Flores-Villar, the Court 
has grappled with the possibility of distinctions in immigration 
statutes involving naturalization that may further narrow the plenary 
power’s scope.241  Thus, the Court could also apply the lessons of the 
plenary power’s constitutional limitations and the distinctions 
possible within immigration law to cases involving admission.242 
Given the volume of the plenary power’s history, it is unlikely that 
this evolution marks the death of the plenary power.243  It does, 
however, signify that with the increasing knowledge of the 
complexities of immigration law and the evolution of constitutional 
standards of review, questions relating to immigration are emerging 
where the plenary power may no longer be an appropriate 
justification.244  A determination of immigrant visa eligibility is a step 
logically prior to admission and is thus beyond the plenary power’s 
scope. 
C. DOMA Is Not a Result of Congress’s Immigration Policy Goals 
In light of the plenary power precedent, Congress could arguably 
make a policy choice to explicitly ban the admission of whomever it 
wants, including homosexuals.245  Such a ban would, however, be 
subject to the facially legitimate and bona fide standard of plenary 
power cases and it is not unlikely that a ban on the admission of 
homosexuals would fail even this relaxed standard.246  Although a ban 
                                                        
immigration statute to comply with constitutional protections); see also T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power:  The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (arguing that Justice Breyer’s use of the phrase 
“subject to important constitutional limitations” in Zadvydas “may represent a 
radical shift, a turning point for immigration law”). 
 241. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the disagreement on the Court over whether 
naturalization could be distinguished from the question of determining whether an 
alien was a citizen). 
 242. See Legomsky, supra note 34, at 926 (noting that the “precise degree of . . . 
deference [to Congress] has varied with both the context and the era”). 
 243. See supra Part I.A (elaborating on the plenary power’s scope and 
development).  But see Spiro, supra note 104, at 339 (contending that the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional analysis in Nguyen and Zadvydas forecasts the demise of the 
plenary power doctrine). 
 244. See Motomura, supra note 34, at 565 (maintaining that once the immigration 
inquiry is expanded “to include the more general law of aliens’ rights . . .  the force 
of the plenary power doctrine diminishes considerably” and courts often adopt 
approaches that are in conflict with the plenary power doctrine). 
 245. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120–22 (1967) (affirming the exclusion of a 
homosexual foreign national because Congress intended the ground of 
inadmissibility for those “afflicted with psychopathic personality” to exclude 
homosexuals); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that even if the immigration policy reflects a 
cruel prejudice or “offend[s] American traditions,” it is the prerogative of 
Congress). 
 246. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (explaining that the 
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on admission may offend constitutional principles, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that in its broad power over immigration, 
“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens.”247  In fact, Congress sought to exclude 
homosexuals with the 1952 INA and bolstered that exclusion when it 
amended the INA in 1965 to deny admission to those “afflicted with 
sexual deviation.”248 
DOMA, however, is readily distinguishable from Congress’s past 
explicit policy choice to prevent the admission of homosexuals.  
DOMA was not the product of Congress legislating in immigration, 
and while it has provided a lens through which executive branch 
officers interpret the INA, it did not amend the INA itself.249  
Moreover, the 1990 reform of the INA repealed Congress’s explicit 
ban on homosexual admission,250 depriving DOMA of any statutory 
basis for imposing a practical ban on admission.251 
Unlike most of the statutes confronted by the courts in establishing 
the plenary power precedent,252 DOMA was not aimed specifically at 
immigration and is not an expression of Congress’s policy 
distinguishing among aliens for the purposes of federal benefits.253  
In Mathews, the Supreme Court decided that Congress could 
constitutionally distinguish among aliens based on years of residency 
                                                        
departure from Bowers was justified by an “emerging awareness” in the latter half of 
the twentieth century that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); see also Gill 
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (concluding that 
DOMA’s treatment of same-sex marriage lacks any rational basis because it is not 
“directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective”), aff’d sub nom.  
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 247. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–80 (1976) (stating that aliens are not 
entitled to all the advantages of citizenship and that Congress treating aliens 
differently from citizens is not necessarily “invidious”). 
 248. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, FAMILY, UNVALUED:  
DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. 
LAW 24–25 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
FamilyUnvalued.pdf (describing Congress’s intention to ban the admission of 
homosexuals with the 1952 amendments to the INA by excluding “aliens afflicted 
with psychopathic personality, epilepsy or mental defect”). 
 249. See supra Part I.B (explaining Congress’s aims in passing DOMA). 
 250. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, supra note 248, at 28. 
 251. See INA §§ 212, 237, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2006) (making no reference to 
homosexuality as a ground for inadmissibility or removability). 
 252. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57–58 (2001) (involving a challenge to a 
provision in the INA); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 789 (1977) (same); Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889) (involving a challenge to Congress’s 
immigration legislation with the Chinese Exclusion Act).  
 253. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (emphasizing that the question 
facing the Court was not one of aliens versus citizens in the eligibility for federal 
benefits, but rather a question of whether distinctions can be drawn within a class of 
aliens so that some are eligible for benefits while others are not). 
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for purposes of eligibility for federal benefits.254  In the DOMA 
context, however, the basis for the distinction is the nature of the 
marital relationship.255  While Congress may have relatively 
unfettered power to make policy choices distinguishing among 
aliens,256 the difference between a distinction based on years of 
residency and a distinction based on the nature of a marital 
relationship⎯which is likely to invoke the Court’s precedent 
involving the fundamental right to marry⎯requires a thoughtful 
analysis of the constitutional issues at stake.257 
Unlike DOMA, the statute upheld in Fiallo precluded recognition 
of a particular relationship expressly for the purposes of immigrant 
visa eligibility.258  The challenged statute was a provision of the INA 
barring illegitimate children from qualifying for a non-quota 
preference category based on a relationship with a U.S. citizen 
natural father.259  After analyzing the INA and legislative history of 
this exclusionary bar, the Court concluded that preferential status 
should not be extended to illegitimate children and their natural 
fathers.260  The Court reasoned that because Congress amended the 
INA to recognize the relationship between an illegitimate child and a 
U.S. citizen natural mother for preferential status, but had 
intentionally refused to extend this status to U.S. citizen natural 
fathers, Congress’s policy choice was clear.261  Unlike the challenged 
statutory provision in Fiallo, the legislative history of DOMA does not 
focus on immigration statutes or DOMA’s effect in immigration.262  
More importantly, the legislative history of DOMA does not indicate 
that Congress expressly intended to distinguish among the class of 
                                                        
 254. Id. at 83. 
 255. See supra Part I.B (explaining DOMA’s effect in immigration). 
 256. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (recognizing the “limited scope of judicial inquiry” 
in Congress’s policy choices involving admission). 
 257. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (insisting that “[m]arriage is one 
of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival” 
(citation omitted)); see also Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA:  
How Immigration Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 455, 
465 (2008) (arguing that DOMA’s application in immigration infringes on the 
fundamental right to “make decisions related to marriage”). 
 258. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799–800; see also supra Part II.C (explaining the Court’s 
reasoning in Fiallo). 
 259. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799–800. 
 260. Id. at 797, 799–800. 
 261. Id. at 797. 
 262. See supra Part I.B (discussing DOMA’s passage); see also Scott Titshaw, A 
Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & Etc.:  Immigration Law the Defense 
of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 446–52, 
466–67 (2011) (discussing DOMA’s limited legislative history and indicating that 
Congress was aware of DOMA’s immigration consequences even though immigration 
was not a focus during DOMA’s passage). 
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foreign nationals by extending the immediate relative classification to 
heterosexual couples but not same-sex couples.263  Moreover, DOMA 
did not necessitate a change in the INA because “child” and 
“parent” are explicitly defined in the INA264 but “marriage” is not.265  
Thus, DOMA cannot be defended as Congress’s policy choice in 
immigration. 
Accordingly, Congress’s plenary power in immigration policy 
decisions cannot insulate DOMA from traditional constitutional 
review.  The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s power to 
make policy choices in immigration as inherent to its plenary power 
in immigration.  DOMA, however, was neither a result of Congress’s 
policy making in immigration nor an explicit practical decision to 
extend a benefit to some classes of foreign nationals but not others. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DOMA’S APPLICATION IN 
IMMIGRATION SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW BECAUSE CONGRESS DID NOT ENACT DOMA 
USING ITS PLENARY POWER 
Even though DOMA influences the immigration process, Congress 
did not enact DOMA using its immigration authority.  Thus, judicial 
review of DOMA’s effect in immigration should not be limited to the 
deferential constitutional standards applied in plenary power cases.266  
If the plenary power doctrine is narrowed such that DOMA’s 
application in immigration falls outside the plenary power’s scope, 
the level of scrutiny that would apply to a constitutional challenge to 
DOMA in the immigration context, like the fate of DOMA itself, is 
not entirely clear.267 
                                                        
 263. See supra Part I.B (discussing DOMA’s legislative history). 
 264. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006). 
 265. See supra Part I.B (discussing how marriage is defined in immigration law). 
 266. Although Congress arguably did not enact DOMA using its immigration and 
naturalization authority, DOMA may apply to the immigration context as a public 
policy exception to marriage recognition.  See supra Part I.B (discussing public policy 
exceptions in marriage recognition).  The reconciliation of general rules of marriage 
recognition and federal public policy exceptions exemplifies the tension between the 
federal and state powers to define marriage under the Constitution’s Full Faith and 
Credit Clause⎯a conflict at the heart of the DOMA debate.  This conflict is beyond 
the scope of this Comment; it is sufficient to differentiate between Congress’s 
plenary power to legislate in immigration and its authority to assert a public policy 
exception to marriage recognition.  Unlike the plenary power doctrine, a public 
policy exception does not prohibit or influence judicial review.  See Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (concluding that a state public policy exception 
foreclosing recognition of interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See generally Titshaw, supra note 6, at 579–93 (discussing federal public 
policy exceptions to marriage recognition). 
 267. See Mark Strasser, What if DOMA were Repealed?  The Confused and Confusing 
Interstate Marriage Recognition Jurisprudence, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 249, 249 (2010) 
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When legislation involves foreign nationals, but was not enacted 
under Congress’s immigration or naturalization authority, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that traditional equal protection 
standards apply.268  Moreover, the INA, which contains a number of 
restrictions and limitations on judicial review of immigration 
decisions,269 does not prohibit a constitutional challenge to DOMA in 
the immigration context.  The INA explicitly states that none of its 
provisions “shall be construed to preclude review of constitutional 
claims.”270  Since Congress did not enact DOMA using its 
immigration or naturalization power, a constitutional challenge to 
DOMA’s discrimination based on sexual orientation in the 
immigration context should be scrutinized like any other alleged 
equal protection violation. 
Although DOMA can be distinguished from immigration law’s 
apparent exceptionalism in constitutional analysis, the scrutiny 
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation in the 
traditional equal protection framework is unsettled.271  In his 
February 23, 2011 letter to Congress, Attorney General Holder stated 
that President Obama has determined that DOMA’s federal 
definition of marriage, as applied to same-sex couples legally married 
under state law, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.272  In reaching this determination, the President 
                                                        
(arguing that it is unclear whether a “state would have the power to refuse to 
recognize a [same-sex] marriage valid . . . in another state” in the absence of 
DOMA); Titshaw, supra note 6, at 537 (doubting that a repeal of DOMA would 
“result in a clear, uniform rule recognizing all same-sex marriages” in immigration 
because of the INA’s lack of clarity). 
 268. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 374 (1886) (stating that the 
provisions of the Equal Protection Clause are “universal in their application” and 
concluding that a city ordinance, which discriminated against a class of immigrants, 
was unconstitutional); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (stating that an 
alien is a “person” for the purposes of constitutional protections, whatever his status 
under the immigration laws).  But see Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (concluding that the INA’s denial of visa preference to same-sex spouses 
was constitutional in light of the INA’s then explicit bar on homosexual admission). 
 269. See INA § 242 (outlining the myriad limits on judicial review of immigration 
decisions under the INA). 
 270. Id. § 242(a)(2)(D); cf. id. § 202(a)(1)(A) (containing a clause prohibiting 
discrimination based on “race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence” 
but not sexual orientation in the issuance of immigrant visas). 
 271. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
homosexuals are not a suspect class and that classifications based on sexual 
orientation do not warrant heightened scrutiny); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 
455 F.3d 859, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 
F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).  But see Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA fails rational basis review 
and violates equal protection), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 272. Letter from Att’y Gen., supra note 13. 
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concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation should be 
subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny and that DOMA would 
fail to meet this standard.273  Attorney General Holder thus 
announced to Congress that the executive branch would not defend 
DOMA in federal court cases challenging its constitutionality.274  This 
announcement, while arguably a victory for DOMA’s opponents, does 
not affect the adjudication of binational same-sex couples’ petitions 
for immigration benefits because the Attorney General also stated 
that the executive branch would continue to enforce DOMA outside 
of the courtroom.275 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has not ruled that classifications 
based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny.  The 
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans276 applied rational basis review to 
invalidate a state statute that encouraged discrimination based on 
sexual orientation,277 and the Court has since avoided the question of 
whether claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation warrant 
heightened scrutiny.278  Many federal circuit courts of appeals have 
also declined to extend heightened scrutiny to classifications based 
on sexual orientation.279  Moreover, some scholars argue that 
DOMA’s interference with the marital decisions of U.S. citizens 
infringes on a fundamental right and thus is subject to strict 
scrutiny.280  The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to 
frame immigration questions in terms of the rights of affected U.S. 
citizens.281 
In addition to equal protection concerns, opponents have 
criticized Congress for exceeding its power in domestic relations by 
                                                        
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 277. Id. at 635. 
 278. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (focusing on the right to privacy 
and due process instead of the issue of what level of scrutiny applies to classifications 
based on sexual orientation). 
 279. See supra note 271 (illustrating in several cases that homosexuals are not a 
suspect class and warrant only rational basis review). 
 280. See Pinix, supra note 257, at 458 (arguing that DOMA infringes on the 
fundamental rights of U.S. citizens and that equal protection “trumps” the plenary 
power doctrine); Cori K. Garland, Note, Say “I Do”:  The Judicial Duty to Heighten 
Scrutiny of Immigration Policies Affecting Same Sex Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 711 
(2009) (advocating for heightened scrutiny and less deference to Congress’s plenary 
power because DOMA affects the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens). 
 281. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977) (concluding that immigration 
policy decisions are entrusted exclusively to the political branches, regardless of the 
effects of these decisions on the rights of U.S. citizens); United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (refusing to frame the question as whether a 
benefit extended to a U.S. citizen can be revoked without a hearing and instead 
focusing on whether an alien has a right to admission). 
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enacting DOMA.282  At a July 2011 hearing before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on the impact of DOMA, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, an ardent opponent of DOMA, argued that the Act is the 
single exception to a traditional legal scheme that has left marriage, 
divorce, adoption, and inheritance rights to the states.283  In a variety 
of contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized the general rule that 
domestic relations are the prerogative of state and not federal law.284  
Thus, whether the federal government can define the spousal 
relationship is at the heart of the DOMA debate.285  To allow 
Congress to do so in immigration simply because of the field’s legal 
exceptionalism would ignore the fact that this debate is unsettled. 
Much remains undecided in both the specific constitutional 
scrutiny of DOMA and the general role of constitutional review in 
immigration law.  After the Attorney General’s February 2011 letter, 
binational same-sex couples in immigration proceedings may find 
their cases closed or placed on hold,286 while same-sex couples 
petitioning for immigration benefits will likely be denied 
altogether.287  This confusion leaves foreign nationals, like Paul 
Wilson Dorman, in a legal limbo.  As this situation develops, 
abandoning the plenary power justification for DOMA should at least 
allow courts to apply traditional constitutional standards of 
review⎯whatever those standards may ultimately be⎯rather than the 
deferential or diluted standards employed in modern plenary power 
                                                        
 282. See The Respect for Marriage Act:  Assessing the Impact of DOMA on American 
Families:  Hearing on S. 589 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011) 
[hereinafter Respect for Marriage Act Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(noting her disagreement with the policy); see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (deciding that DOMA raises 
federalism concerns by regulating an area customarily left to states’ discretion). 
 283. See Respect for Marriage Act Hearing, supra note 282, at 3 (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein) (insisting that the determination of marriage rights remain the 
“preserve of State law”). 
 284. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997) (recognizing that state domestic 
relation orders regarding community property interests of separated or divorced 
spouses and their children are matters for state law and are not preempted by federal 
statutes); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing, in the context of parental rights, that the area of domestic 
relations “has been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good 
reason”). 
 285.  Cf. Pinix, supra note 257, at 464 (asserting that the Court has frequently 
struck down regulations that restrict marriage because the Constitution protects 
marriage decisions). 
 286. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing immigration courts’ 
hesitation to strictly enforce DOMA despite immigration courts and the BIA being 
bureaus or agencies for the purposes of DOMA’s federal definition). 
 287. See ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 158 (advising adjudicators to 
deny the visa petitions of same-sex partners). 
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cases.288 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration cases since the 1970s indicate that the plenary power 
is no longer an unqualified barrier to judicial review.  Rather than 
acting as a bulwark against judicial review, the plenary power doctrine 
should be interpreted narrowly and its limited application recognized 
in light of the myriad complexities in immigration law.  A limited 
substantive framework for the plenary power’s scope is possible, and 
plenary power case law suggests that not all political branch decisions 
involving immigration can be insulated from traditional standards of 
judicial review.  The Supreme Court should recognize the limits of 
the plenary power rather than avoid the doctrine the next time it 
grants certiorari to a case in the unsettled line of Miller, Nguyen, and 
Flores-Villar challenges.  If the Court adopts a nuanced plenary power 
framework, DOMA’s application in immigration may fall outside the 
scope of that power. 
With the Supreme Court’s failure to confront the plenary power 
doctrine in Flores-Villar, constitutional jurisprudence in immigration 
remains a field mired with complexities and exceptions.  Until the 
Supreme Court confronts DOMA’s constitutionality or Congress 
repeals the Act, the fate of binational same-sex couples like Paul 
Wilson Dorman and his spouse remains undecided.  By freeing 
DOMA’s application in immigration from the plenary power 
justification, the conversation on DOMA’s constitutionality can 
include its immigration consequences. 
                                                        
 288. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the constitutional standards applied in 
modern plenary power case law). 
